Russia in the fifth year of the "SVO": a crossroads between "North Korea" and partial normalization

In the fifth year of the full-scale war, the Russian regime faces the question of formalizing the results of the "SVO" ("Special military operation," as the Kremlin refers to the war against Ukraine). While Putin has not achieved his desired outcomes on the geopolitical level or in Ukraine, domestically he has a real chance to complete a transition toward a totalitarian system. However, the authorities have not made a final decision on whether this path would ensure the regime’s long-term stability.

In choosing between partial normalization in domestic and foreign policy or a course toward building a closed totalitarian state, Putin will be guided primarily by internal political considerations, the economic situation, and the positions of his inner circle. The central decision, however, is whether to stop the war or to continue/escalate it.

Positions of key social groups, institutions, and elites:

• The sociological majority (the regime’s social base) will accept any choice made by the leader.
• "Z-patriots" and most of those involved in the war support its continuation, even at the cost of Russia’s decline.
• Opponents express anti-war views but are unable to institutionalize them.
• Putin’s inner circle is driven by group interests; there is no consensus, with both advocates of a "North Korea model" and supporters of partial liberalization (at least economically) present.
• Big business favors ending the war and normalization but, due to limited agency, follows Putin’s lead.
• The managerial class prefers normalization but will implement any decision in line with its function.
• The military lacks political agency.

The regime assumes that any decision will be accepted by a compliant majority. Therefore, it seeks to maintain public loyalty and dilute the influence of what it sees as its main political threat — the "Z-patriots."

The 2026 State Duma elections will be one of the key indicators of the path chosen by Putin. However, the Russian leadership will aim to preserve the current inertial scenario for as long as possible, viewing any shift in course as a crisis requiring additional effort and posing risks to regime stability.

Starting in autumn 2024, amid the lack of strategic gains at the front, the Kremlin faced a dilemma: either wind down the "SVO" or enter a new round of escalation. Unlike a similar moment in autumn 2022, Putin did not make a quick decision, instead choosing a strategy of delay regarding the war. In domestic policy, however, a clear course was set toward the systematic archaization of public life and a transition from authoritarianism to totalitarianism.

The continuation of the war provides the regime with an intuitively understandable logic for gradually introducing totalitarian practices: "everything for the war, everything for victory." At the same time, the Kremlin is relatively cautious in implementing full-scale totalitarian elements. The authorities seek a situation in which they can benefit from the "advantages" of a totalitarian system while avoiding its more burdensome aspects. In other words, the regime is prepared to impose ideological control, maximize oversight over public and private life, and resort to repression and terror. However, it aims to avoid genuine mass mobilization, so that society does not become politically active or demand the achievement of the regime’s declared goals. What Putin needs is not an active society, but an obedient one. Therefore, the authorities carefully ensure that the sociological majority simultaneously supports official actions and slogans, yet approaches national issues with the attitude: "this is not for us to decide."

Key markers of a limited totalitarian transition in 2025:

• Strengthening of information and digital control. Throughout the year, calls via Telegram and WhatsApp were restricted, the transfer of SIM cards to third parties was banned, fines were introduced for "searching for extremist materials" online using VPNs, and a system of electronic draft notices was implemented. Access to registries was also restricted. These policies continue into 2026.
• Continuous generation of prohibitions. Alongside digital restrictions, various everyday behavioral bans were regularly proposed, many of which were implemented. Even seemingly absurd rules—such as fines for sunbathing on a balcony in underwear or feeding stray animals in public places—serve to test public reaction: whether citizens are still willing to comply with any new measures. For officials, proposing and enforcing such bans is also a way to demonstrate loyalty and effectiveness within the system.
• Militarization of public discourse. The "cult of victory over fascism," the use of war-related visual symbols, and propaganda centered on "service" and "sacrifice" are accompanied by the imposition of military ideologies and everyday behavioral models, as well as the development of paramilitary structures. The primary target audience is the younger generation. Movements such as "Movement of the First" mirror Soviet-era pioneer organizations, while "Yunarmiya" serves as a foundational structure for early military-oriented training.
• Expansion of the powers of security forces. The National Guard, police, and the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) are receiving broader powers to exert forceful pressure on the population and various social groups (including migrants, ethnic communities, and civic activists). At the same time, recurring cases of abuse of power are shielded administratively and informationally.
• Creation of an ideological barrier between Russia and the Western world. The promotion of "traditional values" is aimed less at uniting society internally than at drawing a boundary with external communities, which Russian propaganda portrays as embodying "Nazism and Russophobia," excessive tolerance toward LGBTQ+ people, and conditions fostering deviant individual and group behavior.

The compliant majority

Summing up the sociological results of 2025, the Telegram channel Nezygar noted: "Most of society is not immersed in the topic of the ‘SVO’ at all and, in difficult times, tends to retreat into its own closed world." At the beginning of 2026, the same source observed that the 2025 trend of declining trust in the authorities in Russia persists, though it remains within levels safe for the regime: 66% believed the country was moving in the right direction, compared to 21% who thought otherwise; Putin’s approval rating stood at 84% (the lowest in six months); the average rating of governors was 69%. At the same time, Nezygar presumes that in 2026 sociological agencies "will avoid showing a sharp drop in government ratings."

This forecast has begun to materialize not only in approval ratings but also in issues central to the public agenda. According to monthly polling by the Levada Center, in January 2026, 76% of respondents said they supported the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. At the same time, 61% believed that peace negotiations should begin, while 30% supported continuing the war. These January figures differed significantly from late 2025, when support for negotiations and for continuing the war reached, respectively, historic highs (66% in December) and lows (25% in December). However, in February public sentiment returned to late-year trends: 67% supported starting negotiations, while 24% supported continuing the war—new maximum and minimum values for the period of the full-scale war.

At the same time, 59% of Russians believed that to accelerate peace it would be necessary to "intensify strikes against Ukraine," including with new types of weapons. Only 21% supported making additional concessions to Ukraine and the West. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 2026, optimism regarding the timeline for ending the war declined: 39% expressed optimism (up from 32%).

A "long or even ‘endless’ SVO" is increasingly perceived in the public consciousness as a source of inevitable hardship and restrictions, fostering resilience to further economic deterioration, Nezygar writes. In other words, the average Russian is willing to endure the war despite a desire for it to end. From the standpoint of the broader population, the regime does not expect serious challenges. On the contrary, this stance of the majority provides the Kremlin with a social base for virtually any policy—both domestic and foreign.

However, while the regime faces no major problems with society at large, it does encounter challenges from several active and motivated groups that are capable of influencing the broader situation in the country and shaping their own agendas—agendas the authorities must take into account.

"Heroes of the SVO"

The social group of participants in the invasion of Ukraine numbers around 2 million men of active working age, alongside those indirectly involved in the war: volunteers, propagandists, defense industry workers, and family members.

Over four years of war, this group has significantly improved its material well-being and views the "special military operation" as a risky but effective channel of social mobility. Participants in the invasion are generally not interested in ending the war.

The regime is attempting to prepare for integrating this group into a postwar reality. To that end, it is building an infrastructure around this social group to maintain state control over it.

In particular, since 2024, the federal program "Time of Heroes" and its regional analogues have been implemented. Its declared goal is to bring a "new elite" into public administration, as Putin describes participants in the invasion. In practice, it serves to label selected members of the existing administrative class as "SVO heroes" and use this cadre base to create mechanisms of control over the group.

Similar objectives are pursued through campaigns to bring war participants into elected office. According to official data, during the 2025 Unified Voting Day, 1,035 "SVO participants" won elections at various levels. However, as with the "Time of Heroes" program, the most significant positions went to already vetted officials at federal and regional levels who were, in one way or another, branded as "SVO candidates."

For the group as a whole, the regime offers benefits, support for entrepreneurial initiatives, and priority employment—particularly in security structures. However, returning participants are often reluctant to join the police or the Federal Penitentiary Service due to significantly lower pay and institutional resistance. At the same time, there are numerous cases of antisocial behavior, crimes involving veterans, and their integration into criminal networks.

The authorities still lack a clear strategy to prevent war participants from becoming a destabilizing factor in domestic politics. Until such a solution is found, continuing the war remains an effective means of controlling the "SVO heroes." As a result, the group continues to grow, increasing the social burden on the state not only in the present but also for decades to come.

"Z-patriots"

According to Levada Center polling, throughout 2025 about 25–35% of respondents supported continuing the war. In January 2026, 30% of Russians expressed support (18% unequivocally, 12% leaning toward continuation). The core of this pro-war minority is the older generation. However, what concerns the authorities is the active segment of this group—propagandists of various levels, military bloggers ("voenkory"), and carriers of a nationalist worldview. These are the actors commonly described as "Z-patriots."

The active part of this pro-war minority lacks a clear, unified leadership. Those who have attempted to assume such a role have been sidelined by the regime in various ways. Yet the group remains politically active and capable. It possesses a largely uncontrolled segment of the information space, autonomous sources of funding (donations, fundraising, access to war-related financial flows), and sufficient narrative resources to shape its own agenda. In effect, "Z-patriots" constitute one of the few horizontal communities in Russia today—a type of structure the regime is not well equipped to manage.

At times, their position aligns with the authorities, as their narratives help sustain the impression of a mobilized society united around the war. However, the Kremlin understands that this loyalty will persist only as long as it continues to act in ways that satisfy this group.

 A telling episode occurred in January 2026, when, amid intensified discussions about negotiations, a number of "Z-channels" published alarmist claims that "Putin had agreed to reparations, reconstruction of Ukraine at Russia’s expense, gas supplies at cost price," and similar assertions. There was no credible evidence that such plans existed. Nevertheless, the "Z-community" proactively signaled that any reconciliation scenario would be unacceptable to them.

The Kremlin took note—not so much regarding peace negotiations themselves, but in response to this uncontrolled initiative. By February, it had launched another wave of restrictions on communication platforms.

After observing that "voenkory" had played a significant role in the information support of the Wagner mutiny, the authorities attempted to reach an understanding with them. That effort was not successful. Subsequently, the regime adopted a more diversified approach: co-opting some prominent figures, working to control financial flows, and initiating criminal cases against certain "Z-activists" for misuse of donations related to the war. In February 2026, Alexey Kostylev, founder of the well-known "Z-aligned" outlet Readovka, was detained and accused of embezzling 1 billion rubles in contracts with the Ministry of Defense. Some figures have also been excluded from media platforms.

However, the authorities still lack a coherent strategy for dealing with this pro-war minority and its active core—especially in scenarios involving de-escalation, military setbacks, or socio-economic strain. For now, "Z-patriots" and the regime are fellow travelers, but not strategic partners. The difference lies less in their shared support for the war’s goals, and more in how they envision the role of "patriots" in shaping state policy and Russia’s future trajectory.

"The dissenters"

The sociological potential of the "dissenters" is estimated at around 20%, according to various polls. However, unlike the "Z-patriots," this group is largely disorganized. After 2012 (the Bolotnaya Square protests), the regime systematically and harshly cleared out the environment of potential leaders. More importantly, the former liberal opposition now outside Russia—the so-called "good Russians"—has lost the ideological contest to the regime. Even maintaining communication channels with Russian society, the "democratic" opposition offers little beyond criticism of the regime’s "wrong actions." It lacks a coherent ideological alternative; many opposition figures still share elements of the same imperial worldview promoted by the authorities.

The opposition also lacks a clear vision of the future. The notion of a "Beautiful Russia of the Future" functions more as an ironic meme than as a substantive ideological or programmatic platform for the fragmented anti-Putin opposition in exile.

Russian society tends to intuitively perceive "dissenters" as carriers of "Western values," largely as framed by state propaganda. As a result, in the near term, Russian society is unlikely to embrace ideas or projects coming from this milieu.

Paradoxically, this means that for parts of the Russian opposition, a scenario of further transformation of the regime—a deeper totalitarian transition and increased isolation—may be more advantageous. If Putin and key figures of the regime were to reengage in dialogue with the West, the "good Russians" would lose their role as the exclusive representatives of Russia on the international stage.

Putin’s inner circle

After effectively "resetting" his power in the 2024 presidential election, Putin appears to have finalized his domestic strategy: to remain in power for as long as possible (ideally for life) and to further consolidate the regime.

To support these goals, his inner circle has been partially restructured. Changes have taken place among those closest to him, and this circle now consists of several groups of influence that ensure both his physical security and political longevity.

1. Sergey Kiriyenko and the Kovalchuk brothers

Kiriyenko oversees domestic policy. He is responsible for кадровая политика, manages the sociological "tuning" of public opinion, and controls ideology and digital oversight. His influence has expanded to include the so-called "imperial periphery" (occupied territories, unrecognized entities, Moldova, the Caucasus) as well as broader external strategy.

Together with the Kovalchuk brothers—who possess significant media resources—he plays a decisive role in shaping information policy. Mikhail Kovalchuk, director of the Kurchatov Institute, is associated with ideas about extending Putin’s longevity, while Yuri Kovalchuk remains one of Putin’s closest confidants. He has retained this status even after his influence during Putin’s COVID-era isolation reportedly contributed to decisions that led to the war, which has not delivered the expected results.

2. The tandem of Sergey Chemezov and Nikolai Patrushev

Patrushev’s dismissal from the post of Secretary of the Security Council after the 2024 election was unexpected. However, he did not fall from favor: he remains part of the inner circle and continues to be one of the ideological drivers of the war.

Chemezov, in turn, provides the material backbone of the war, controlling the defense-industrial complex and heavy industry. This long-standing partnership—dating back to their KGB years—could, in theory, position them as contenders in a post-Putin scenario. However, the group lacks a strong candidate for leadership. Patrushev’s son, Dmitry, serves as deputy prime minister but is not currently viewed as a likely successor.

3. Security structures

The FSB, often described as the backbone of the modern Russian state, has become a кадровый reservoir and a "vanguard" of the regime, but it does not exercise independent institutional influence over it. Notably, a dual structure has persisted within the FSB for some time. Alexander Bortnikov remains both the nominal and actual head of the service, while First Deputy Director Sergey Korolev maintains direct contact with Putin and oversees his own sphere of responsibility.

Another key pillar of the regime is the National Guard (Rosgvardiya). Its head, Viktor Zolotov, began his career as Putin’s bodyguard. He has a distinctive network of political connections, in which a particularly important role is played by his alliance with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov, like Korolev within the FSB, has his own "domain" within Rosgvardiya: his personal forces—Akhmat battalions—are formally integrated into this structure.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) does not play a political role. Its primary function is to maintain control over the internal situation—above all, over the "street," which the regime, still wary of "color revolutions," continues to fear.

Alexey Dyumin—head of the State Council, presidential aide, and former member of Putin’s security detail—has not, over the past two years, become a particularly influential figure within the Russian power system.

4. Energy sector

Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, is not only responsible for generating oil revenues for the state budget but also wields broader influence, including over the силовой bloc. He remains one of the figures whose views carry weight with Putin.

Gazprom, led by Alexey Miller, is going through a difficult period. Miller’s influence has been on a gradual decline. Nevertheless, the gas monopoly remains a key instrument of the regime—not only economically, but also in terms of infrastructure, social policy, and power projection.

Rosatom falls within Kiriyenko’s sphere of influence and is one of the assets that helps position the deputy head of the presidential administration as a central figure within the regime.

5. Kirill Dmitriev

The rise of the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) has been tied to the start of the negotiation process between Russia and the United States. Dmitriev is not a full-fledged center of influence in Russian politics. However, he plays a notable role in a project personally important to Putin—maintaining contact with Trump’s circle and restraining the United States from exerting excessive pressure on Russia.

6. Administrative and managerial elites

Key figures here include Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin. Both are still, by inertia, perceived as potential "successors." Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both have tried to distance themselves from the pro-war agenda.

Similarly restrained positions on the war are held by Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina and ministers from the economic bloc. It was this "economic group" that, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in 2025, cautiously raised concerns about the Russian economy’s ability to sustain the war effort. However, this careful rhetoric does not mean that the top administrative elites are not fully engaged in supporting the war—they continue to ensure its functioning at a practical level.

7. Foreign Ministry and propaganda

Within Putin’s system, diplomacy has significantly lost its independent role, effectively becoming part of the broader propaganda apparatus and an executor of Kremlin directives. Notably, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other leading figures of the ministry often act more as spoilers of negotiation processes than as active participants.

In reality, the strategy and tactics of Russian diplomacy are shaped by the Presidential Administration, particularly presidential aide Yuri Ushakov. Meanwhile, the key figures of Russian propaganda—who have been instrumental in cultivating revanchist and pro-war sentiment—continue to serve the regime.

Big business

The oligarchic business sector, which once acted as a social driver in the formation of Russia’s authoritarian system, has now been removed from meaningful participation in decision-making. Putin has sufficient leverage to dictate the terms of engagement with the oligarchs.

In effect, the Russian leadership is sending a clear message to large domestic capital: pre-war conditions no longer exist, nor do opportunities for international projects. The model of "earning in Russia, spending in the West" is no longer viable. Business must either "return to Russia" or risk being labeled as disloyal.

The nationalization campaign of 2025 significantly strengthened the role of the state in the economy. It also enhanced the positions of individuals within Putin’s inner circle, who are gaining control over financial flows and the distribution of state subsidies.

At the same time, big business retains a degree of agency. Throughout the full-scale war, this milieu has periodically voiced calls for its end (for example, Oleg Deripaska). In February 2026, Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article titled "On the Need to Change the Model of Economic Growth in Russia," which was widely perceived as a manifesto of the business community, supported by part of the bureaucracy. Its core idea was that an economic model based on raw-material exports has reached a dead end, and that Russia needs a new development strategy focused on territorial development.

Such a shift, however, is only possible if the structural constraints of the political regime are removed and the current militarized model of governance is transformed. In other words, unable to secure its own development and facing growing difficulty in providing the resources demanded by the state, big business is effectively raising the question of the need for political change.

The managerial class

The managerial class—bureaucracy at the central, regional, and municipal levels—has its own objective interests. Above all, these are preserving positions within the vertical of power, as well as maintaining and expanding access to resources and budgets. In a broader sense, this category also includes mid- and lower-level economic elites.

This broad stratum of elites plays a key role in implementing the regime’s policies, including ensuring the functioning of the entire infrastructure that supports the war. Publicly, it fully aligns with Putin’s course. At the same time, it is precisely the mid-level elites that most consistently articulate a demand for peace. For them, the end of the war would mean access to new resources tied to "normalization"—resources that could be no less beneficial than those linked to maintaining a pro-war agenda.

This same environment effectively resists Putin’s idea of broadly integrating "SMO veterans" into governance and public life: the bureaucratic nomenklatura has little interest in new competitors.

The military

More than 70% of Russia’s population consistently declares support for the "actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine." However, from the very beginning of the war, the regime has carefully ensured that no widely popular figures emerge from within the military who could gain political agency. Any general who, at some stage of the war, gained public visibility and was promoted by military bloggers as a "father to soldiers" or a "future general of victory" (Lapin, Surovikin, Teplinsky) quickly lost opportunities for public prominence.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense itself has been the target of demonstrative anti-corruption purges, which has further limited the army’s institutional standing.

For the Russian regime, the military is a complex institution. On the one hand, sustained investment in the armed forces enabled Putin to launch the central project of his rule—the war against Ukraine. On the other hand, the military has not delivered the stated objectives of the "SMO," and at this stage Putin appears to be seeking acceptable outcomes through other means, including pressure on energy infrastructure and negotiations.

Thus, while the army remains a primary geopolitical tool for the Kremlin, it has also become a source of internal risk: a milieu in which potentially destabilizing elements have formed, whose return to civilian life could pose challenges for the regime.

The war: impossible to continue, impossible to end

By the fifth year of the war, the resource of "delaying time" for making a strategic decision—whether to seek a real exit or continue fighting—has largely been exhausted. And if the war continues, the question becomes how and where: only in Ukraine, or by raising the stakes and attempting to destabilize NATO and the broader Western world? Despite external pressure on Russia and growing internal challenges, the "key to the war" still remains in Putin’s hands.

Putin has not achieved any of the strategic goals that led to the start of the war. Russia has not become a global geopolitical center, has not secured exclusive policing functions in the post-Soviet space or Eastern Europe, and has not eliminated the Ukrainian state.

Therefore, in making his decision, the Russian leader will primarily be guided by the imperative to preserve, strengthen, and prolong his personal power.

He will weigh, above all, the positions of elite groups, as well as the arguments "for" and "against."

Arguments for ending the war:

• The economic situation is approaching the limits of sustaining both the war and an acceptable level of social support.
• Public fatigue, despite declared support, creates a growing demand for ending the war.
• Part of the elite—both within the inner circle and more broadly—sees more advantages in ending the war than continuing it.
• The need to address accumulating domestic problems, exacerbated by the regime’s focus on the war.

Arguments for continuing the war:

• The absence of results that would secure Putin a place in history alongside figures like Peter I or Catherine II.
• The stance of the mobilized pro-war segment of society, which can influence the national agenda and potentially evolve into opposition.
• Fear of the return of more than a million veterans, who could destabilize the system.
• The position of pro-war elites, particularly within Putin’s immediate окружение.

In domestic politics, Putin’s overall strategy is unlikely to change, regardless of whether the war ends within the next one or two years. However, the question of the war is the key factor shaping how that strategy will be implemented and what final configuration the regime will adopt.

Ending the war would bring internal political dynamics—especially the question of power transition—to the forefront. The elites are already operating within a latent logic of transition. If the war stops, this logic would become dominant, potentially clashing with Putin’s intention to remain in power for at least another decade and to preserve the core features of the current system for many years beyond.

"Pentabasis" and "sacral power"

The regime is searching for an ideological foundation for domestic stability in what is seen as the final phase of Putin’s rule. The war effectively marked a unilateral withdrawal by the Kremlin from the informal social contract under which the state ensured a stable—and gradually improving—standard of living, while society refrained from exerting political control over the власти.

Before and at the outset of the war, the regime offered the population a sense of "greatness" in exchange for reduced social guarantees. However, by 2024–2025 it became clear that this notion of "greatness," in a form intuitively convincing to the average citizen, could not be delivered. As a result, recent ideological developments increasingly appeal to what is seen as a favorable trait of Russian society for the regime—its propensity for compliance. Strengthening this trait has become a central objective.

In April 2025, an article titled "Civilization ‘Russia’" was published by Alexander Kharichev, head of the Presidential Administration’s department for monitoring and analyzing social processes and a key figure in Kiriyenko’s team. Kharichev advanced the idea of sacralizing power within a framework of "special statehood," where authority is not merely a political institution but something more fundamental.

By 2026, speaking at the "Knowledge. State" forum, Kharichev returned to the concept of the "pentabasis," which he presented as the foundation of the "Russian civilization": individual – society – family – country – state.

Within this updated framework, the envisioned future of the regime is described as "a strong, modern, and comfortable country with equal opportunities for all." The ideal citizen, from the власти’s perspective, is a patriot oriented toward creative labor and service, supportive of family values, and a team player.

In essence, the expectation placed on society is obedience—the readiness to accept any demands of the state, even when they conflict with societal interests. Provided this condition is met, the regime would retain the capacity to pursue virtually any domestic transformation and any course of action on the international stage, including military ones.

State Duma elections

On September 18–20, 2026, elections to the State Duma will take place. At the same time, at least seven regional heads (including Chechnya), members of 39 regional legislative assemblies (including St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Leningrad regions), and 10 city councils (including Kaliningrad, Ufa, and Perm) will be elected.

Given that the Kremlin tightly and effectively controls Russia’s political and information space, there is little doubt that the results will reflect the regime’s vision rather than the will of the population. The key question, therefore, is: what will these elections actually be about?

The presidential election effectively became a plebiscite that granted Putin an informal mandate for lifelong rule. Parliamentary elections cannot fully serve that function, but the 2026 campaign will have several distinctive features:

• It will be the first campaign in a long time to take place amid economic slowdown and declining social standards for those not involved in the war.
• The participation of "SVO veterans" is intended as a significant step in integrating Putin’s "new elite" into power—something that will face resistance from broad segments of the elite and will not enjoy strong public support.
• Key issues that genuinely concern the population—such as the war, the state of the economy, and their interconnection—will remain outside the official campaign agenda, with authorities insisting that the situation is under control.
• By the time the active phase of the campaign begins, the population will have been deprived of familiar communication platforms that previously served as sources of alternative information, horizontal exchange, and emotional release.

Under these conditions, the central question will be how the authorities frame the campaign: as a first step toward a "return to normality" in domestic politics, or as an "oath of loyalty" by elites and society to a prolonged war and the restrictions that come with it.

The full-scale war against Ukraine was conceived by Putin as a tool for solving a broad set of regime objectives. Geopolitically, it was meant to restore Moscow’s position among the world’s leading powers. Regionally, it aimed to eliminate Ukrainian statehood and identity. Domestically, it was intended to strengthen Putin’s personal authority and extend the regime’s lifespan as much as possible.

By the fifth year of the "SMO," Putin has no realistic chance of achieving his geopolitical goals. Russia is not becoming an independent center of power but is instead growing increasingly dependent—technologically, economically, and politically—on China. He has also failed in Ukraine: although Ukraine has lost territory, it has strengthened its capabilities and agency. Only in domestic politics has the regime been relatively successful, steadily consolidating its control.

The ongoing totalitarian transformation may well be completed. However, Putin faces a fundamental choice: either to build a "North Korean–style" system across one-eighth of the Earth’s landmass or to partially normalize the situation (as some elites advocate), possibly leveraging a degree of political goodwill from Trump. A "deal" with the United States could provide the regime with resources needed for internal consolidation.

In deciding Russia’s domestic trajectory, Putin will primarily focus on preserving and strengthening the regime and his own power. But the central question remains whether to end or continue the war.

If the war is stopped, internal turbulence is likely, driven by pro-war forces. In this scenario, the regime would rely on the "quiet majority," stabilizing the situation mainly through financial measures—social payments, economic projects, and information management—rather than repression.

If the war continues or escalates, the nature of instability will be different. The main risk would come from the broader population as a potential source of unrest. In that case, the regime would rely primarily on coercive tools—repression, surveillance, and control—to manage the threat.

Having had a long "window of opportunity" since late 2024, Putin has delayed making a definitive choice for as long as possible. However, the ability to sustain this inertia is diminishing. A decision will have to be made: either move from imitation of negotiations to real agreements, or announce mobilization; either partially liberalize the domestic system or tighten control further; either attempt to restore dialogue with the West or close off from the world and focus on preserving power for the long term.

This decision may prove as consequential as the one to launch the full-scale war. Putin appears to recognize that his 2022 decision was not optimal, and any shift away from the current trajectory would implicitly acknowledge that mistake—since the "special operation" would not reach a clear and logical conclusion.

Fearing a second major error, he delays the decision and tries to preserve as many options as possible. Despite the regime’s outward strength, another strategic miscalculation may not be forgiven—by elites, by the most active segments of society, or by the population as a whole …or all of these groups.

Written by Volodymyr Nahirnyi, PhD in Political Science